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1. Introduction 
Although adaptation to severe or chronic physical conditions can be difficult, 
modern self-management interventions have shown effectiveness in helping patients 
adapt and manage the symptoms and the physical and psychological demands of 
illness (Maes & Boersma, 2004; Sansom-Daly, Peate, Wakefield, Bryant, & Cohn, 
2012; Schneiderman, Antoni, Panedo, & Ironson, 2010). Still, there is evidence that 
these interventions also have significant limitations. Their impact is often small (see, 
for example, Peytremann-Bridevaux, Arditi, Gex, Bridevaux, & Burnand, 2015; van 
der Heijden, Abrahams, & Sinclair, 2017), they may be effective only in the short-
term (Goldbeck, Fidika, Herle, & Quittner, 2014), while their efficiency and usability 
in different clinical settings is also questionable (Leventhal, Weinman, Leventhal, & 
Phillips, 2008).  
So far, self-management intervention efforts in chronic patients have typically 
been based on programmes or techniques that stem from the vast experience gained in 
the treatment of psychological difficulties (such as the behavioural or cognitive-
behavioural therapy, CBT) and which is adapted to the context of a physical disease 
(e.g., Taylor, 2006). Most of the time, these interventions are not guided by (or take 
into serious consideration) the theories that specifically have been developed in order 
to describe the process of adaptation to illness (Maes & Boersma, 2004). Thus, a 
crucial step in the effort to develop effective and efficient interventions for chronic 
patients is to integrate intervention approaches with theoretical developments on self-
management and adaptation to illness (Leventhal et al., 2008; Maes & Boersma, 
2004). 
The Common Sense Model of self-regulation (CSM) is probably the most 
widely used theory to explain and predict adaptation to illness and patients’ behaviour 
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and self-management choices (Leventhal, Diefenbach, & Leventhal, 1992; Leventhal, 
Halm, Horowitz, Leventhal, & Ozakinci, 2005; McAndrew et al., 2008). Although 
not often, the CSM has already been used, in combination with CBT-oriented 
techniques, as a guide for the development of self-management interventions (e.g., 
Broadbent et al., 2009; Glattacker et al., 2012; Petrie et al., 2002; Siemonsma et al., 
2013; Theunissen et al., 2003). A common feature of the majority of these 
intervention efforts, however, is their main focus on illness representations 
(especially, the cognitive ones) and action plans/goal setting (i.e., they target 
problem-solving self-regulation). Although, as we will present later, these are indeed 
important aspects of the CSM, several other also important aspects are not usually 
incorporated. Such aspects include the regulation of emotions (Cameron & Jago, 
2008; Cameron, Booth, Schlatter, Ziginskas, & Harman, 2007), the self-regulation 
system coherence (McAndrew et al., 2008; Phillips et al., 2016), the (semi-)automatic 
processes (Breland, Fox, Horowitz, & Leventhal, 2012), the transformation of action 
plans into specific personalized activity and then into habits (Breland et al., 2012; 
Phillips, Laventhal, & Laventhal, 2013), as well as their embedment into patients’ 
self-system (Leventhal et al., 2008). The failure to include these components into 
intervention programmes likely results from the fact that these intervention 
programmes are not readily amenable to dealing with these aspects. 
In the field of psychological intervention approaches, a novel and very 
promising model is Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT). ACT is a relatively 
new and dynamic framework rooted in clinical behaviour analysis and cognitive 
behaviour therapy and based on Relational Frame Theory (RFT; an extension of 
behaviour analysis). It aims to increase psychological flexibility and workability in 
individuals via the acceptance of all private events (thoughts, emotions, sensations 
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etc.), cultivating present moment awareness and a stable sense of self, and clarifying 
and acting upon personal values – even in the presence of illness (Hayes, Strosahl, & 
Wilson, 2011). ACT has effectively been used in the management of several 
psychological and physical health problems (Hayes, Barnes-Holmes, & Wilson, 2012; 
Ruiz, 2011), and although it stems out of the greater CBT tradition, it moves 
psychological intervention forward by addressing problems and difficulties often 
present in the more traditional CBT approaches (Hayes et al., 2012). For example, 
there is evidence that ACT facilitates lower dropout rates (Karekla et al., under 
review), is efficacious for treatment-resistant patients (Gloster et al., 2015), and better 
prepare clients to engage in behavioural change actions, improving thus the efficiency 
and usability of the intervention (Hayes et al., 2012).  
ACT seems to share certain concepts and ideas with CSM. For instance, as we 
will present later in greater detail, both models emphasize the role of action plans and 
actual behaviour in achieving a more successful adaptation to a condition, the 
importance of constant feedback and (re-) evaluation processes, the significance of 
automatic/habitual processes (i.e. pre-existing behavioural patterns), as well as the 
role of “self” as the context in which self-regulation efforts are embedded. Thus, we 
believe that ACT probably has greater potential that other intervention approaches, 
such as the more traditional CBTs, to translate the critical aspects of CSM into 
intervention practice (for a comparison between ACT and CBT see Ruiz, 2012). In 
this way, the combination of CSM and ACT may render self-management 
interventions more pervasive and easily administrated to a greater number of patients. 
The aim of the paper is to describe this combination. Namely, how CSM and ACT 
can be integrated in novel, effective and efficient self-management intervention 
programmes for chronic patients. 
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The proposed integration may also help professionals consider alternative ways 
of translating CSM concepts into practice, besides the use of the typical CBT 
methods, which has been the norm so far. Moreover, it could help the examination of 
the pathways through which critical aspects of the CSM (e.g., self as context) are 
linked to health outcomes. As a recent metanalysis indicated, very few studies have 
examined the processes involved is illness-related self-regulation, as well as the 
impact of contextual factors. Also, the majority of these studies employ a correlational 
design (Hagger, Koch, Chatzisarantis, & Orbell, 2017). Thus, the integration of CSM 
with novel intervention approaches, like ACT, and the examination of its impact on 
self-management with the use of clinical experimental study designs, could move 
forward our understanding of the self-regulatory processes in illness.  
2. The CSM and adaptation to illness 
The CSM (Leventhal, Meyer, & Nerenz, 1980; Leventhal et al., 1992) is a well-
established framework for understanding the patient-related and broader (e.g., social 
environment) factors that affect adaptation to illness and the associated health 
outcomes. According to the CSM, adaptation to illness is a dynamic self-regulation 
process (Diefenbach & Leventhal, 1996; Leventhal et al., 1980; Leventhal et al., 
2005). First, patients develop dynamic and interactive cognitive and emotional 
representations of their experience in order to make sense of the disease. They, also, 
develop specific representations about each coping procedure or treatment option. 
Guided by their representations, patients develop short- and long-term action plans 
and employ certain coping procedures to manage symptoms and regulate negative 
emotions.  
The reactions to physical symptoms are often guided by the activation of an 
illness-related memory schema or prototype which is based on personal previous 
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history, knowledge and beliefs about an illness. Each prototype typically includes 
illness and treatment-related representations (e.g., “I am just tired. Some rest and 
everything will be fine; no need to see a doctor”), potential action plans (e.g., “To get 
well, I need to rest for a couple of days”), and expected outcomes (e.g., “It will go 
away, if I rest”). The activation of a prototype determines to a great extent patient’s 
behaviour and symptom management.  
 The success of the efforts undertaken and the outcomes are appraised by the 
patient (e.g., “do I feel better now?”) and are compared with the expected or desired 
endpoints. The product of this evaluation process may cause revisions to the original 
illness and treatment representations, action plans and actual behaviour through a 
feedback loop.  
A relevant aspect of the CSM is “coherence”. Coherence refers to the 
consistency among the ‘internal’ aspects of the illness-related self-regulation 
mechanism (e.g., illness representations, action plans) and the patient’s experience 
that their behaviour (e.g., adherence to treatment; health behaviour change) succeeds 
in controlling the illness or fulfilling their expectations (Leventhal et al., 2005; 
Phillips, Leventhal, & Leventhal, 2013). Coherence is achieved when the system 
feedback indicates that the expected goals are realized. That is, when the patient’s 
behaviour and the treatment they follow seem to work, confirming thus the accuracy 
of their representations about illness and treatment (Phillips et al., 2013). Patients 
may use an array of feedback channels in order to assess the coherence of their self-
regulation efforts. These channels may refer to the patient (e.g., felt physical 
symptoms, emotional state etc.) or the social environment (e.g., feedback from close 
others, input from medical professionals; Tanenbaum et al., 2015).  
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 Coherence is a critical self-regulation factor as it secures the continuation of the 
behaviour that the patient has adopted (at least until feedback signalling the need for 
correction is received). For example, when the system is not coherent, the patient re-
evaluates and probably changes their representations and/or action plans (Phillips, 
Cohen, Burns, Abrams, & Renninger, 2016). On the contrary, a coherent system may 
lead to stable behavioural patterns able to provide the patient with a sense of control 
over the condition (Phillips et al., 2016; Tanenbaum et al., 2015).  
The self-regulation process is shaped by two levels of memory processing that 
work in parallel (Leventhal et al., 1992): conceptual or propositional, which is the 
memory about illness or symptoms and consists of abstractions, causal inferences and 
outcome expectations based on personal thoughts and evaluations, as well as 
schematic or perceptual/experiential, which is the memory of illness or symptoms and 
consists of information/experience of prior illness and emotional episodes. Through 
the “symmetry” rule, perceptual events (e.g., the perception of a symptom) create a 
pressure for a conceptual event (e.g., labeling) and vice versa (e.g., a person seeks 
relevant symptoms when is diagnosed with a specific disease; Leventhal et al., 2005). 
According to the CSM, the entire illness-related self-regulation mechanism is nested 
in the self-system (e.g., personal attitudes and goals, role identities, self-assessed 
overall health), and both are nested in the broader social, cultural and ecological 
context (Leventhal et al., 2005).  
The CSM has mostly been used as the theoretical framework for studying the 
relationships between illness representations, emotions, health behaviours, and illness 
outcomes (for reviews see, for example, Dempster, Howell, & McCorry, 2015; 
Foxwell, Morley, & Frizelle, 2013; Hagger et al., 2017; Hudson, Bundy, Coventry, & 
Dickens, 2014; McSharry, Moss-Morris, & Kendrick, 2011). Rather few studies have 
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focused on the use of this model as a basis for developing intervention programmes. 
For example, Petrie, and colleagues (2002) examined the effectiveness of a brief 
hospital intervention aiming to alter myocardial infraction patients’ representations 
about their illness. Almost at the same period, Theunissen, de Ridder, Bensing and 
Rutten (2003) conducted an experiment to study whether illness representations and 
the action plans of patients with hypertension change when their physicians are 
trained to discuss these topics. Since then, CSM has served as the basis for 
intervention programs for several health problems, including chronic pain (e.g., 
Glattacker, Heyduck, & Meffert, 2012; Siemonsma et al., 2013), asthma (e.g., Petrie, 
Perry, Broadbent, & Weinman, 2012), heart diseases (e.g., Broadbent, Ellis, Thomas, 
Gamble, & Petrie, 2009; Lee, Cameron, Wünsche, & Stevens, 2011), cancer 
(Richardson, Tenant, Morton, & Broadbent, 2017), skin disorders (Fortune, Richards, 
Griffiths, & Main, 2004) etc. Additionally, special forms of cognitive intervention 
designed to modify illness representations have been developed (e.g., the “cognitive 
treatment of illness perceptions”; Siemonsma et al., 2013).  
These interventions, however, seem to focus mostly on illness representations 
and action plans, almost ignoring other important aspects of the CSM (e.g., the role of 
the self-system). Furthermore, these interventions have not focused on motivational 
and predetermined factors. It is rather assumed that individuals automatically want to 
change their thoughts or behaviors as a result of the health problem. Still, this has 
been shown to not be always the case, as we will discuss later. At this point, we will 
turn to present Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT), an empirically tested 
conceptual and clinically driven model that can easily be applied for various health-
related conditions. 
3. Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT) 
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Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT) has its roots in principles of 
modern radical behaviourism (particularly Relational Frame Theory- a behavioural 
theory of language and cognition; see Blackledge, 2003 for more details) and 
philosophy (i.e., functional contextualism; Hayes, Barnes-Holmes, & Wilson, 2012). 
ACT targets skills that promote acceptance and mindfulness while simultaneously 
cultivating valued actions (Hayes et al., 2012). ACT proposes that human suffering, 
including psychopathology and various health related problems, are a direct result of 
inflexible and context incongruent patterns of behaviour (i.e., behaviour based on 
abstract rules devised by the person, rather than what would be functional in the 
specific situation). That is, a person rigidly uses specific learned and rule-governed 
ways of dealing with adversities, regardless of the context at hand and irrespective of 
whether these result in desired outcomes. As a result, the person may become “stuck” 
in old pre-existing habitual ways of responding, which may be ineffective for the 
situation at hand, such as a new or chronic health problem. For example, one’s rule to 
“work hard, be self-reliant, and the problem will go away” will not necessarily work 
well for them in the face of chronic illness. When these rigid rules do not deliver the 
expected outcome, the person may start to appraise not only the situation as 
problematic but also themselves as being ineffective (decreased self-efficacy). Coping 
methods applied may be unsuccessful (especially if they are rule-governed and 
inflexible to the contextual needs) and may result in increased (judged as negative) 
emotional reactions, such as stress, frustration, and sadness. The result is, more 
cyclical cognitive appraisals of the self as being ineffectual or that the situation is 
hopeless. The person may report being stuck and indeed ACT proposes that cognitive 
fusion (i.e., responding to thoughts or emotions as if the content of the thoughts 
themselves are reality and “the truth” and acting based on the literal content of these 
10 
 
thoughts) leads to even more rigidity (Hayes, Luoma, Bond, Masuda, & Lillis, 2006). 
The result is a multiplication of additional ineffective behaving (e.g., avoiding 
medical advise, inappropriate use of medication, searching for a quick easier fix) 
creating a continuous loop that the patients are unable to break on their own.  
Problematic responding to adversity (including a chronic health condition) and 
barriers, is summarily referred to as experiential avoidance, i.e., inflexible and 
context-insensitive attempts at reducing or eliminating painful or feared internal 
events (thoughts, emotions, sensations, memories; Hayes, Luoma, Bond, Masuda, & 
Lillis, 2006). Experiential avoidance is associated with a host of pathological mental, 
behavioural, and physical outcomes including behavioural health (Hayes et al., 2006; 
Hayes, Strosahl, Wilson, 2011; Gloster, Meyer, & Lieb, 2017) For example, a person 
suffering from a chronic illness may go to great lengths to avoid experiencing any 
symptoms associated with the illness (e.g. pain, discomfort, etc.) or try to evade 
unwanted internal events associated with that illness (e.g., thoughts such as: “I can’t 
handle this!” or “Why me?”) and may result in various ineffective behaviours (e.g., 
taking excessive analgesic medications, avoiding exercise or social events, 
excessively searching for medical reassurance) in order to achieve this. Though this is 
to be expected and it makes evolutionary sense to avoid potential threats of harm, the 
problem arises when the person insists on avoiding any unwanted internal events 
irrespective of the achieved outcome. That is, for example, instead of achieving the 
desired goal, it instead increases the unwanted thoughts and emotions, which in turn 
elicits even more unhelpful behaviours (e.g. giving up, using substances, blaming, 
ruminating etc.) to achieve the original goal (avoid contact with the negative stimuli). 
Usually, experiential avoidance results in the formation of mental rules, rigid and 
inflexible patterns of behaviour, which in turn lead to not only problematic 
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management of the health problem, but ultimately to the degradation of well-being 
and life functioning (e.g., “I cannot go on vacation as I may tire my legs and then be 
in a lot of pain and spoil everyone else’s vacation as well”).  
The goal of ACT is to promote Psychological Flexibility (PF). PF refers to a 
range of inter- and intra-personal skills that can be defined as the ability to “recognize 
and adapt to various situational demands; shift mindsets or behavioral repertoires 
when these strategies compromise personal or social functioning; maintain balance 
among important life domains; and be aware, open, and committed to behaviors that 
are congruent with deeply held values” (Kashdan & Rottenberg, 2010). PF is 
considered a fundamental aspect of health and is the antidote to the costs of 
experiential avoidance. PF is comprised of six interrelated skills and each of these are 
targeted in ACT (Hayes et al., 1999, 2011). The six skills (and experiential avoidant 
alternative) are: (1) acceptance (vs. avoidance, suppression, etc), (2) cognitive 
defusion (vs. cognitive fusion), (3) present moment focus (vs. loss of contact with the 
now or being in an “autopilot” mode of functioning, (4) having a stable and 
transidental sense of self (vs. attachment to a conceptualized self), (5) clarification of 
and living based on deeply meaningful chosen values (vs. confusion about what is 
important and/or living life in incongruence to what is really important for the person 
(i.e. values confusion, behaviour discrepant from one’s values), and (6) committed 
purposeful action (vs. inaction, impulsivity, non-functional or persistent avoidant 
behaving.  
Procedurally, experiential methods, including metaphors and exercises, are 
used in ACT. They aim to increase direct experiential contact (e.g. what will actually 
happen if I go on vacation) over dominance of literal verbal rules (“if I have pain, I 
can’t go on vacation”). Therefore the therapeutic stance in ACT is one of mistrust 
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towards the literal content of thoughts and the attempts at avoiding internal events. 
Instead, the focus is on bringing the person into direct contact with the experience, in 
the present, and at the same time allowing valued chosen actions, consistent with 
increasing functioning in daily life, to occur. For example, in a case report (Karekla & 
Constantinou, 2010), of a cancer patient treated using ACT, it was demonstrated how 
via utilizing the patients’ spiritual and family values to drive acceptance of the illness 
facts (e.g., hair loss as part of a chosen treatment that could save her life and not as 
her mind was telling her (and thus holding such thoughts lightly) that it was a 
punishment for not being a “good” Christian), in the present, the client was better able 
to cope with her illness and live a meaningful life.   
Promotion of the PF components in chronic illness illustrates the potential for 
chronic illness management. For example, Gillanders et al. (2015), showed that 
among a heterogeneous group of cancer patients cognitive fusion was the strongest 
predictor of anxiety symptoms and avoidant coping was the strongest predictor of 
depressive symptoms and lower quality of life. Research has also found evidence for 
the salience of PF in other health-related problems (see Graham, Gouick, Krahé, & 
Gillanders, 2016 for a systematic review), including: diabetes (Gregg et al., 2007), 
epilepsy (Lundgren et al., 2006), irritable bowel syndrome (Ferreira, 2011), 
thalassemia (Karekla, et al., 2015), and chronic pain (McCracken & Vowles, 2008). 
The full ACT therapeutic model has been examined in various randomized clinical 
trials. In general, ACT has been found to aid in improvements in various health 
related problems with medium to large resulting effect sizes (see also Ruiz, 2012 for a 
review and meta-analysis), including: physical activity (Butryn, Forman, Hoffman, 
Shaw & Juarascio, 2011), obesity (Forman et al., 2013), smoking cessation (Gifford et 
al., 2004; Hernandez-Lopez et al., 2009; Karekla et al., 2010), distress associated with 
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end-stage cancer (Branstetter, Wilson, Hilderbrandt, & Mutch, 2004), tinnitus distress 
(Hesser, Westin, Hayes, & Andersson; 2009), multiple sclerosis (Sánchez, & Luciano, 
2005), prevention of HIV (Gutiérrez, Luciano, Bermúdez, & Buela-Casal, 2007), and 
irritable bowel syndrome (Ferreira, 2011). 
Chronic pain has generated the most ACT research to date and is recognized 
as an Empirically Supported Treatment by the American Psychological Association 
for chronic pain. In the case of chronic pain, it is seen that suffering and life 
functioning limitations result from ineffective attempts at controlling pain and its 
symptoms. McCracken & Vellerman (2010) found that psychological flexibility 
accounted for more variance in measures of health than pain intensity. In one of the 
first ACT trials for chronic pain, Dahl and colleagues (2004), found ACT to result in 
fewer medical treatment utilizations and less sick days compared to treatment as 
usual. Similarly, Wicksell and colleagues (2008) showed that ACT led to significant 
improvements in functioning, life satisfaction, fear of movements, and depression 
among individuals with longstanding pain compared to wait-list control. Interestingly, 
these effects were maintained at the 7-month follow-up. There are now more than 10 
randomized clinical trials showing similar results and provide support for the efficacy 
of ACT for chronic pain (Scott & McCracken, 2015).  
4. Combining the CSM and ACT 
Based on the CSM conceptualization, a patient’s illness representations are the 
basis of the self-regulation process involved in coping-with-illness procedures and 
behavior (Leventhal et al., 1980). ACT, on the other hand, although it puts emphasis 
on the role of behaviour rather than on perceptions, also recognizes the importance 
that patients often ascribe to the latter. Thus, a first step necessary to integrate CSM 
and ACT within chronic illness would be the assessment of patient’s cognitive and 
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emotional representations about their health problem. Towards this end, emphasis 
should be placed on behavior and the ways typically used to regulate it when facing a 
health problem (see also Table 1).  
Following the mapping of patient’s representations and illness-related 
behaviour, the next step is to discuss the results with the patients and help them 
understand the connection between “inner” factors (i.e., cognitive and emotional 
representations), “external” behaviour (i.e., coping with illness and symptoms), and 
adaptation to illness. For example, discuss how the rigid belief that “nothing can help 
with my symptom” (a sign of cognitive fusion in ACT) may result in frustration and 
avoidance of any further effort to deal with that symptom (experiential and behavioral 
avoidance) or may engage in non-functional coping strategies such as rumination 
(preoccupation with the past or thoughts of a foreshortened future; Karekla & 
Panayiotou, 2011), which in turn may distance the patient from valued activities in 
their life and diminish well-being (Hayes et al, 2011).  
According to ACT, two types of reactions towards cognitions and emotions are 
maladaptive: the attempt to avoid or “get rid” of painful thoughts and feelings, which 
often results in increasing cognitive/emotional and behavioural avoidance, as well as 
responding to them as the only valid explanation of reality which may hold the patient 
to inaction (e.g., when a patient fears a change). However, in contrast to the more 
traditional cognitive-behavioural interventions, ACT does not aim in challenging and 
replacing these thoughts or representations (Hayes et al., 2013). This is a delineation 
point from the existing intervention programs based on CSM (e.g., Glattacker et al., 
2012; Fortune et al., 2004; Siemonsma et al., 2013), which in accordance to the 
traditional CBT, aim to alter cognitions/appraisals in order to achieve behavior 
change. We believe, however, that given that the ultimate goal of CSM is behavior 
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change and better adaptation to illness, this model can better be combined with ACT, 
which tries to guide patients not towards changing internal events like cognitions, but 
towards finding meaning as to why change would be important for them and then 
committing to action plans, even in the presence of unwanted thoughts and emotions.  
Towards this end, cognitive defusion may be used as an intervention technique. 
Cognitive defusion refers to the ability to observe inner events, such as cognitions and 
emotions, from a distance so as to gradually understand that they are not facts or rules 
that dictate behaviour, but rather the –often inaccurate– ways one represents the world 
(Gillanders et al., 2015). For example, putting a simple phrase like “I am having the 
thought that….” before a cognitive illness representation (e.g., “I am having the 
thought that nothing I do can help me with my symptoms”) may help the patient 
understand that it is only a belief and not a fact (Harris, 2009). Extensive other 
cognitive defusion exercises exist with varying lengths and intensities (see Hayes 
2012). Cognitive defusion thus presents a new way by which to deal with 
dysfunctional illness representations (hold thoughts and evaluations lightly instead of 
fighting with them) and may prove to be more effective in dealing with particularly 
problematic and sticky cognitions that are often associated with inactivity or 
maladaptive action uptake.  
Another relevant ACT component that could be formally incorporated into the 
CSM based interventions (and may indeed have been implied to date) is acceptance. 
Acceptance refers to allowing unpleasant thoughts, feelings, sensations, and 
evaluations to come and go without “struggling” with them and their supposed 
importance (Hayes et al., 2013). It includes acceptance of the current situation and of 
the internal world of the person (i.e., thoughts, emotions). For instance, instead of 
focusing on the worrisome thoughts and aiming at changing them before action can be 
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taken, ACT proposes that the patient observe these feelings and thoughts by adopting 
a scientist or detective mindset. For example, “What can I do when I hold this thought 
to be literally true?” vs. “What can I do when I treat this thought as a thought and 
move on without struggling with it?” This will help the patient to explore and observe 
feelings and thoughts investigatively in order to understand their function and 
recognize them for what they are, that is, just thoughts and feelings and not for what 
they say they are (i.e. something threatening based on illness representations). From 
this standpoint, the person can then choose to act centred upon what is important to 
them, such as spending quality time with a loved one even if feeling pain, rather than 
become stuck with their minds’ content (e.g., if you go out with your friend, your 
headache will get worse). There is evidence that such an approach helps patients 
better regulate their emotions and respond to their thoughts in a more 
effective/functional way (e.g., Gillanders et al., 2015).  Once this step is achieved, the 
emphasis in the next steps is on setting goals, planning relevant courses of action, and 
committing in the effort to follow them, all in the context of living a valued life. 
According to the CSM, the assessment of patient’s illness representations allows 
the designation of health-related goals and specific action plans in order to achieve 
these goals (Leventhal et al., 2005). Each action plan, in order to be effective, should 
be tailored to the patient’s characteristics, be relevant (i.e., make sense to the patient) 
and in consistence with the patient’s representations and goals (i.e., coherence), and 
should incorporate conscious processes and habitual reactions (i.e., newly acquired 
behavioural patterns promoting long-term illness self-management; McAndrew et al., 
2008). ACT skills can be utilized and be combined with this CSM knowledge so as to 
serve as a suitable way to realize this complicated task.  
17 
 
ACT emphasizes action towards the achievement of goals, which, however, 
should ideally also correspond to personal values (i.e., consistent with the patient’s 
broader life; Wilson, Sandoz, Kitchens, & Roberts, 2010). By doing so, the 
probability is increased that the patient follows though – even when difficult – 
because it is something they deeply care about. If the goals are not consistent with 
values, however, the patient is less likely to follow through with the things they 
simply “have to do” because their health care provider told them so. To tip the 
balance in the favour of values, ACT suggests that the key to successful behaviour 
change and greater well-being is to (a) “re-discover” or “clarify” personal values (i.e., 
what is important in one’s life and what gives meaning to changing a behavior), 
which are often “blurred” because of everyday living with illness and symptoms and 
in ACT terms, “fused” with the content of thoughts, (b) set goals (including health-
related goals) based on personal values such as “I will walk for 10 minutes in the 
service of my health, because as I value being healthy” vs. “I have to walk 10 
minutes”, and then (c) commit to acting based on these valued (and relevant) goals 
(Hayes et al., 2006). 
In this regard, once patients link health-related goals to personal values, they 
can then plan specific actions to reach these goals (Karekla & Constantinou, 2010). 
For example, let’s consider a chronic pain patient who should increase her mobility 
and who also values family relationships as an important part of life. This patient 
could explore what type of family member they want to be and then how becoming 
more mobile would aid in living such a valued life. Then, commit to a specific action 
plan with the aim to gradually increase her mobility as a way not only to achieve a 
health goal, but also become more able to visit family members and, thus, strengthen 
family bonds. In this way, setting a goal and a corresponding action plan becomes 
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relevant to the patient and more motivating and engaging to follow through. Also, it 
empowers the client to uptake this plan (increases self-efficacy) as it is the clients 
themselves who choose the actions based on what is important to them and it is not 
something somebody else (e.g., a health professional) has told them they should do.   
In fact, as ACT emphasizes the pursuit of action chosen by the patient on the 
ground of their own long-term values and life-goals, it pinpoints the latter as 
milestones that should guide behaviour (including health-related behaviour), even 
when conditions become adverse. Importantly, increasing valued behaviours precedes 
reductions in suffering (Gloster et al., 2017). Further, valued actions are always 
possible and available if one is flexible. For example, a patient/client would be asked 
what meaningful action can be taken today in service of their love of their children, 
even though they may not survive this illness. In this example, the choice is about the 
possibilities of today rather than the fused stories about what the future may or may 
not bring. To the extent that an important health-related action plan is integrated into 
patients’ broader valued goals, the continuity of the illness self-regulation mechanism 
and probably its effectiveness are enhanced.  
Furthermore, ACT may provide the means to bring habitual and automated 
behaviours (i.e. pre-existing maladaptive behavioural patterns) into the 
intervention/health-behaviour change process. As already noted, according to the 
CSM, the self-regulation process is driven and its contents (e.g., illness behaviour) are 
partially defined by habitual or semi-automatic mechanisms (Breland et al., 2012; 
Orbell & Verplanken, 2015). Likewise, ACT suggests that rigid and inflexible mental 
rules and maladaptive behaviours are often linked to each other in ways that 
individuals may not even acknowledge, as in an “autopilot” mode. The function of 
those is recognized to be usually negative reinforcement where actions temporarily 
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lead to a decrease in the unwanted thoughts/emotions (Kashdan, Barrios, Forsyth & 
Steger, 2006). In this regard, it is important for the patient to be enabled to recognize 
these maladaptive (non-deliberative) skills and their negative impact, and be able to 
disengage from them. Though other researchers have provided suggestions for 
integrating treatment behaviors into automatic daily routines (e.g., Phillips et al., 
2013), ACT proposes two therapeutic techniques that might be particularly helpful 
towards this direction: mindfulness or present moment awareness and cognitive 
defusion, which was discussed earlier. 
Within the context of ACT, mindfulness refers to the process of engaging and 
achieving awareness and acceptance of the present moment rather than follow the 
‘autopilot chain’ of thoughts and behaviour (Harris, 2006). Through the use of 
experiential exercises and metaphor, such as “a body scan” or awareness exercises 
(for relevant examples, see https://contextualscience.org/free_audio) and cognitive 
defusion exercises (e.g., musical thoughts, Harris 2009), patients begin to gain insight 
of these (automatic) internal events at the moment they occur (present-moment 
awareness), for what they are (e.g., cognitive representations or beliefs), make room 
for them (without attempts at changing them) and, instead, choose at that moment to 
put effort and energy into changing their behavior to be more valued consistent 
(Dimidjian, & Segal, 2015). 
With regard to the process of change, ACT underlines that any effort to change 
behaviour and achieve valued goals is an ongoing and dynamic process, as the CSM 
also suggests (Leventhal et al., 1992), which potentially includes several setbacks. 
Therefore, patients are encouraged to monitor changes as they happen (mindfulness 
may prove helpful in this regard) and use the gradual attainment of their goals as the 
appropriate reinforcement for continuing their efforts. Through a feedback loop, this 
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may eventually result in changes into the ways patients represent their condition and 
self (e.g., a perception that an illness bears nothing more than sorrow may change as a 
result of changes in behaviour and the achievement of a valued goal). Thus, the 
content of illness representations may not be directly targeted in ACT as in more 
traditional CBT approaches, but instead the emphasis is placed on changing the 
relation between these representations and resulting actions. This may be one salient 
reason why ACT is particularly useful with “treatment-resistant” patients who have 
not responded to other treatments (Gloster et al., 2015).   
The emphasis that ACT puts on clear and relevant goals, as well as on change as 
a contextually based dynamic process, facilitates the long-term engagement in the 
pursuit of these goals (McCracken & Vowles, 2014). In other words, ACT seems able 
to realize what the CSM postulates as necessary conditions for the effective 
implementation of an action plan. That is, specificity, continuous feedback, and 
incorporation of both conscious and habitual processes (Jones, Smith, & Llewellyn, 
2015). In other words, ACT provides the tools to control/intervene upon the areas that 
CSM posits as necessary conditions. 
Finally, ACT describes all symptoms (i.e., identity representations according to 
the CSM) and the particular difficulties that a patient may be faced with (e.g., sleep 
problems, high distress; representations about consequences according to the CSM) as 
parts of the same dynamic “experience” (i.e., the illness or life experience). Thus, it is 
possible in this conceptualization to incorporate all behaviours, thoughts, and life 
situations without suggesting that a patient needs to erase them (e.g., the symptoms of 
an illness). Instead, ACT urges patients to view the entire experience as a whole. To 
accept and make room for what cannot change (e.g., a limitation that will be there for 
a long time) but, at the same time, commit to action in order to modify what can be 
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changed and is relevant to the patient (e.g., modify a health behavior in the context of 
achieving a personally valued goal). This, in turn, is expected to result in 
modifications to the ways patients experience (i.e., represent and react to) their 
condition, including particular symptoms and difficulties. Sometimes the changes are 
only ones of emphasis or perspective (e.g., walking as an expression of being a caring 
family member vs. walking because my care taker told me to). Through this process, 
the patient’s sense of purpose and coherence is reinforced and the commitment to the 
implementation of the action plans is amplified. 
Though we have attempted to propose a combination of the CSM model with 
ACT based on common postulates between the two approaches, we need to 
acknowledge that we did not attempt to reconcile any differences at the basic 
theoretical level. The two approaches may indeed lack theoretical consistency 
between them. ACT foundations lie in functional contextualism where the “truth” 
criterion is a pragmatic one of successful working within a context (see Hayes, 2004), 
whereas the CSM may approach “truth” more mechanistically (i.e., with emphasis on 
processes rather than function) and reductionistically (Leventhal et al., 1997). We 
however believe that combining approaches grounded in research even if they 
originate from different theoretical frameworks may lead to new ideas and present 
with benefits at the application level.  
5. Conclusion 
We believe that the development of intervention programs that integrate the 
knowledge and research experience gained from a well-structured theory regarding 
adaptation to chronic illness, namely, the Common Sense Model of Self-regulation 
(CSM; Leventhal et al., 1980; Leventhal et al., 2005), and an efficient and evolving 
psychological therapy model, i.e., Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT; 
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Hayes et al., 1999; Hayes et al., 2012), may prove especially effective for promoting 
patients’ adaptation to a chronic condition and enhancing their well-being and health. 
Although the CSM has been combined in the past with cognitive and cognitive-
behavioral intervention methods (e.g., Glattacker et al., 2012; Kasteleyn et al., 2014; 
Petrie et al., 2002), those intervention programs have focused only on specific aspects 
of the CSM (mostly, illness representations and action plans) and left out other, 
equally important for a fruitful adaptation to illness, recommendations of the model 
(e.g., regarding the role of automated processes). Therefore, the development of an 
effort that will combine the CSM theoretical and empirical knowledge with the ACT 
theoretical and treatment model may prove to be especially useful in achieving the 
best possible therapeutic outcomes for chronic illness sufferers. In addition, the 
proposed combination may help professionals, who use CSM as a guide to build self-
management interventions, move forward and consider the adoption of strategies and 
techniques that lie beyond the scope of the traditional CBT approaches and, in this 
way, probably achieve better outcomes. 
Indeed, the intervention methods and techniques employed by ACT seem to be 
able to promote several of the features that the CSM considers important for the 
illness-related self-regulation process. As presented earlier, ACT could be used so as 
to promote (a) the overall consistency of the adaptation process, (b) a good match 
between illness-related goals, expected outcomes and action plans as well as between 
illness-related and broader personal life goals, (c) the effective regulation of emotions, 
and (d) the integration of the patient’s newly acquired skills. In addition, (e) ACT 
emphasizes the development and implementation of action plans and behaviors that 
are realistic, tangible and corresponding to personal values (thus, self reinforcing). All 
these may be achieved through the use of multiple feedback channels. Therefore, 
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ACT seems suitable to stimulate a “psychologically flexible”/ adaptive, relevant and 
well nested in the self-context self-regulation process that according to the CSM, is 
crucial for an effective long-term adaptation to illness and for better health (Leventhal 
et al., 2005). 
The combination of ACT and the CSM in an effort to build more effective 
interventions may prove productive for both models. The CSM is a well-known and 
strongly validated theoretical model regarding adaptation to chronic illness 
(Leventhal, Leventhal, & Breland, 2011; Leventhal et al., 2005). Yet, through ACT, it 
may gain a proper vehicle for a more active, complete, and pervasive application of its 
principles in the intervention field. Also, the use of ACT has already been successful 
in dealing with physical health issues and problems (e.g., Butryn at al., 2011; Gifford 
et al., 2004; Gutiérrez et al., 2007; Ruiz, 2012). Still, its combination with the CSM 
may result in the improvement of its efficiency and refinement of its treatment targets 
at least as far as the adaptation to chronic illness is concerned. 
Although both models are grounded on the broader social cognitive robust 
theoretical tradition and share a common strong interest in patient’s valued goal 
oriented behavior as well-fitted in the overall self-context, the effectiveness of their 
combination undoubtedly depends on the characteristics of the health problem and the 
intervention specific aims and attributes. Likewise, the form of the combination 
depends on the patient’s specific needs and the intervention particular characteristics. 
For instance, the use of a therapeutic intervention framework may not be necessary 
for a very short intervention aiming in just providing information or facilitating 
patient’s understanding of their condition, or for patients that are easily motivated to 
adhere to medical advice and engage in health behaviour change, if necessary. On the 
other hand, a more fully deployed intervention addressed to patients with significant 
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adaptation difficulties (as, for example, in several cases of severe chronic pain) may 
take advantage of a broad array of ACT techniques in order to optimize the efficiency 
of patients’ illness-related as well as overall self-regulation mechanism. Moreover, the 
use of ACT strategies and techniques would be especially helpful for those patients 
who, due to several reasons, are faced with significant cognitive or emotional barriers 
that hinder their adaptation to illness (e.g., may not fully accept the health care 
professionals’ explanation of their condition, such as in functional physical 
symptoms, or may be stuck to chronic inactivity and avoidance, such as in severe 
rheumatoid diseases). 
In any case, the effectiveness of the combination of the CSM and ACT, as 
outlined here, remains to be examined in future intervention studies. One such 
controlled clinical trial in chronic pain patients is under way (see clinical trials.gov 
registry reference: NCT02734992). We expect the results of this study and probably 
of others to follow with great expectation, as we believe that the CSM/ACT 
combination may lead to new exciting ways of facilitating adaptation to illness and 
assisting patients’ recovery. This conceptual work in consort with the empirical tests 
have the potential to set off a productive debate about the best possible ways of 
integrating adaptation to illness, on the one hand, and psychological intervention, on 
the other hand.  
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